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Previous studies (Dumontier and Raffournier, 1998, El-Gazzar et al, 1999; Cuijpers and 
Buijink, 2004) typically explain the early adoption of IFRS by firm-specific benefits. 
However, the adoption of IFRS also leads to costs for company insiders, namely less 
managerial discretion and as a consequence smaller private benefits due to increased 
disclosure requirements and less accounting method choices. This paper argues that the cost 
of adopting IFRS depends on characteristics of the institutional environment, more 
specifically the level of investor protection.  
 
Using a sample of European companies, we find that IFRS is more likely adopted in countries 
with strong laws protecting investors and/or extensive corporate governance 
recommendations where the loss of private benefits following IFRS-adoption is lower. 
Furthermore, the results show that corporate governance recommendations are as effective as 
hard laws in stimulating IFRS-adoption and that their impact increases as laws become 
weaker. This suggests that by improving corporate governance codes, countries can easily 
reduce the extraction of private benefits by managers and enhance the quality of the financial 
information. However, when looking at specific recommendations and laws, we find that 
shareholder rights with regard to voting rights and the general meeting need to be regulated 
by law in order to effectively reduce the level of private benefits. 
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1. Introduction 
Over the past two decades, growth in international trade and in capital flows has 
triggered a rising cross-border economic integration. As a consequence, companies 
and investors are increasingly confronted with unfamiliar and incomparable 
accounting standards. This has led to the desire to harmonise accounting standards 
across countries. In Europe, a harmonisation process already started in the seventies 
and eighties (Council of the EC, 1978 and 1983). Nevertheless, significant differences 
between local accounting standards remained due to the incorporation of a 
considerable number of options in the EC Directives
1.  
 
To put an end to the problem of incomparability and to increase the usefulness of 
financial information to users in- and outside the EU, the European Commission 
decided in 2000 that consolidated financial statements of listed companies should be 
published using IFRS from 2005 onwards (EC, 2000). Yet even before this decision 
by the EC, a number of countries, such as France, Belgium, Germany and Italy, 
already allowed listed companies to adopt IFRS instead of the domestic standards
2. 
Other countries have permitted IFRS following the decision of the EC. Hence, until 
2005, companies in these countries were free to choose their accounting standards: 
local GAAP or IFRS. As a result, a number of companies from different countries 
adopted IFRS before it became mandatory in 2005. These companies are called early 
adopters. An interesting question is then what drives companies to adopt IFRS before 
it is compulsory and why have other companies postponed the adoption of IFRS until 
2005.  
 
Previous studies (Dumontier and Raffournier, 1998; El-Gazzar et al., 1999 and 
Cuijpers and Buijink, 2004) investigating the early adoption of IFRS, have focused on 
the benefits for companies. Firms adopting IFRS are typically internationally oriented 
with multiple stock listings and considerable cross-border activities. In this study, we 
incorporate explicitly the costs of IFRS-adoption. The widespread view that the 
adoption of IFRS has many advantages for both investors and companies does not 
                                                 
1 For instance, in the Netherlands companies were until 2001 allowed to deduct goodwill from equity, 
while in most other EU countries goodwill was amortized. Moreover, in countries where goodwill was 
amortized, the maximum amortization period ranged from 5 years (in Belgium) over 20 years (in 
Austria and France) to 40 years (in Germany).  
2 These countries have allowed the use of IFRS since 1998. 
  2 
correspond with reality in which only 15% of the EU companies have adopted IFRS 
in 2002 (PWC, 2002). In this context, previous studies ignore the fact that managerial 
discretion and opportunism may play an important role in the decision to adopt IFRS 
early on (Licht, 2003). As the adoption of IFRS by EU companies is typically 
associated with an increase in disclosure and a decrease in the number of accounting 
method choices (Ashbaugh, 2001; Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000; Ashbaugh and Pincus, 
2001), it leads to a decline in managerial discretion. This results in turn in a loss of 
private benefits for company insiders as it becomes more difficult under IFRS to 
divert corporate assets without being uncovered.  
 
Recent empirical work has found that the private benefits of control which insiders 
are able to extract differ significantly depending upon the level of investor protection 
provided by countries (Nenova, 2002; Dyck and Zingales, 2004). So the costs of 
IFRS-adoption may depend on the level of investor protection offered by the country. 
We distinguish between two types of investor protection: legal investor protection, or 
the extent of laws protecting shareholders, and voluntary investor protection, 
measured by the extent of corporate governance recommendations at country level. 
Although the legal environment is viewed as having the strongest influence on private 
benefits of control (Dyck and Zingales, 2004; Coffee, 2001), we include corporate 
governance recommendations for two reasons. Firstly, the recent accounting scandals, 
such as Enron, Worldcom and Ahold, have led to a renewed attention for corporate 
governance as a mechanism to protect investors from self-serving managers and this 
has given rise to the development of many national corporate governance codes. 
Secondly, in contrast to changing the legal infrastructure of a country, extending the 
number of corporate governance recommendations is less expensive and time-
consuming. So through corporate governance the level of investor protection can be 
enhanced rather cheaply. 
 
This study thus contributes to the current state of the literature by investigating IFRS-
adoption from a cost-side perspective and by linking the costs of IFRS-adoption to 
characteristics of the institutional environment, more specifically the level of investor 
protection provided by countries and the extent of corporate governance 
recommendations. Using a sample of European companies from countries where 
IFRS is allowed in 2001, we find that both laws protecting investors and corporate 
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governance recommendations have a positive influence on the likelihood of adopting 
IFRS early on. In other words, in countries with strong investor protection, costs of 
adopting IFRS are lower. The results also show that laws and recommendations are 
equally effective in stimulating the early adoption of IFRS. Furthermore, corporate 
governance recommendations and laws seem to serve as substitutes as the impact of 
corporate governance recommendations on the early application of IFRS is larger in 
countries with weak laws. Finally, when we look at specific corporate governance 
recommendations and laws, we find that not all recommendations have an impact on 
IFRS-adoption. Recommendations with regard to specific shareholder rights, such as 
the one share/one vote rule, have no impact although the laws prescribing the same 
rights do. 
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we give an overview 
of the existing literature and develop the hypotheses. Section 3 specifies the model 
and defines the explanatory variables. The sample selection and data gathering are 
discussed in section 4. Section 5 presents the results and some sensitivity analyses. 
Finally, the main conclusions are summarized and a number of implications are 
discussed in section 6. 
 
2. Literature review and hypothesis development 
The separation of ownership from control allows managers and controlling 
shareholders to pursue their own objectives at the expense of minority shareholders. 
Accounting standards help to alleviate this agency problem as they regulate the 
information available to outsiders. The more accurate and detailed the accounting 
information is, the more difficult it is for an insider to expropriate value without 
incurring legal penalties or reputational costs (Ferrell, 2004). For instance, La Porta et 
al. (2004) find that an increase in mandatory disclosure requirements is associated 
with a substantially lower level of private benefits of control. Dyck and Zingales 
(2004) show that the extent of disclosure negatively influences the level of private 
benefits insiders can extract. In lax disclosure regimes with a lot of managerial 
discretion, insiders are thus able to expropriate more.  
 
The adoption of IFRS is assumed to lower the private benefits of control as it leads to 
an increase in disclosure and a reduction in accounting method choices compared to 
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local GAAP (Ashbaugh, 2001; Ashbaugh and Pincus, 2001; Leuz and Verrecchia, 
2000). As a consequence, more information about a firm’s operations, assets and 
ownership is available and managers are less able to conceal their expropriation. The 
adoption of IFRS is thus assumed to lead to a cost for managers as it leads to a loss of 
private benefits.  
 
The amount of private benefits insiders have to give up following IFRS-adoption will 
depend on the level of investor protection offered by countries. In countries with 
extended investor protection, private benefits of control are already curbed 
independent of the accounting standards used (Coffee, 2001; Leuz et al., 2003). For 
instance, Nenova (2003) and Dyck and Zingales (2004) find that the value of private 
benefits is lower in countries with better protection of investor rights. As a result, in 
countries with strong legal shareholder protection, the cost of adopting IFRS for 
insiders will be lower as insiders already limit the extraction of private benefits. For 
instance, Leuz et al. (2003) find that the level of investor protection determines the 
level of earnings management in a country. On the other hand, in countries with weak 
laws protecting shareholders, insiders have many private benefits which may be lost 
by switching to IFRS. We thus argue that IFRS will be less likely adopted by 
companies in countries with weak legal shareholder protection. 
 
H1: There is a positive association between the extent of laws protecting 
shareholders and the early adoption of IFRS.  
  
In this paper we also include a feature of the institutional environment not yet studied, 
namely the extent of corporate governance recommendations. The recent accounting 
scandals have given rise to different initiatives to develop national and international 
corporate governance codes. Many of these corporate governance codes, such as the 
OECD Principles of Corporate Governance (1999), state that the corporate 
governance framework should ensure the disclosure of timely and accurate 
information. Besides, many codes formulate recommendations with regard to the 
rights of shareholders, such as the right to appoint management. We thus view the 
extent of corporate governance recommendations as a measure of voluntary investor 
protection.  
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The aim of a corporate governance system is to align managerial and shareholders’ 
interests and in doing so it will minimize the adverse effects of the agency problem. 
Therefore, extended corporate governance recommendations may incite insiders to 
reduce their level of expropriation. For instance, the presence of independent directors 
on the board of directors will enhance the monitoring of managers and will thus 
reduce their ability to extract private benefits. As managers are already limited in the 
amount of private benefits they are able to expropriate, the adoption of IFRS is less 
costly for them. So, similar as with laws, we assume a positive relation between the 
extent of corporate governance recommendations and the early adoption of IFRS. 
This brings us to our second hypothesis: 
 
H2: There is a positive association between the extent of corporate governance 
recommendations and the early adoption of IFRS.  
 
Furthermore, as corporate governance recommendations are not mandatory and can 
thus not be enforced by any authoritative body, we believe that their effect on IFRS-
adoption will be smaller than the effect of laws. So our third hypothesis is formulated 
as follows: 
 
H3: The impact of corporate governance recommendations on the early adoption of 
IFRS is smaller than the impact of laws protecting shareholders.  
 
Finally, we also formulate a hypothesis with respect to the relation between corporate 
governance recommendations and laws protecting investors. According to Black 
(2001) alternative sources of protection become more important if legal rules are too 
weak to provide protection. So, we expect recommendations and laws to serve as 
substitutes. In countries with weak laws protecting investors, the private benefits for 
insiders are high. Extensive corporate governance recommendations could in these 
countries lead to companies being less inclined to extract value, even though laws 
protecting investors are lacking. In other words, companies in countries with weak 
legal investor protection will refrain from adopting IFRS, but this effect can be 
countered by increasing the number of corporate governance recommendations. We 
thus expect that the impact of corporate governance recommendations will become 
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more important as legal investor protection decreases. Our final hypothesis is 
formulated as follows: 
 
H4: The impact of corporate governance recommendations on the early adoption of 
IFRS increases as the extent of laws decreases.  
 
3. Model specification and variable measurement 
Given the hypotheses developed in the previous section, the early adoption of IFRS is 
explained by the extent of corporate governance recommendations, the degree of legal 
investor protection, the interaction between these two variables and some country and 
company control variables. The model looks as follows: 
 
P (IFRSij) =   α + β1 LAW2001j + β2 CGIj + β3 CGIj *LAW2001j
+ β4 DIST_IFRSj+ β5 MARKET_CAPj + β6 EMj
+ β7 SIZEi + β8 AUDITORi+ β9 FINANCIAL_INDi
+ β10 LISTINGSi + β11 OWNERSHIPi + β12 CAPITAL_INTi  
+ εij 
 
with   i = company 
j = country 
 
The variable IFRSij is an indicator variable, which equals 1 if company i in country j 
applies IFRS in 2001. A corporate governance index (CGIj) is developed, measuring 
the extent of corporate governance recommendations of each country in the study. 
Two sources are used to develop the index: the OECD Principles of Corporate 
Governance (1999) and the Comparative Study of Corporate Governance Codes 
published by the European Commission in 2002
3. Forty-three recommendations by 
the OECD are retained for our index (see Table 1). We complemented these 43 
recommendations with 7 recommendations from the EC’s Comparative Study 
(principles 20 to 26 in Table 1). The reason is that the OECD code is rather silent on 
                                                 
3 The OECD principles are used as a benchmark to validate the country corporate governance codes 
because they are widely accepted and referred to. For instance, the World Bank uses these principles as 
a benchmark to draw up country corporate governance assessments. Also the IMF and the International 
Corporate Governance Network (ICGN) subscribe to the principles of the OECD. 
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the different tasks of the board committees (e.g. key functions). However, as for 
instance the audit committee has an important role in verifying the accuracy of the 
accounting information, board committee characteristics should be included in the 
index.  
 
Insert Table 1 about here 
 
These 50 recommendations are then grouped into five categories: general principles, 
principles concerning the board of directors, the board committees and the 
shareholders and principles with regard to disclosure (see Table 1). Each category is 
again divided in a number of subcategories. The general principles comprehend the 
compliance-mechanism and scope of the corporate governance codes. Principles on 
the board of directors include its mission, key functions and independence. Principles 
on the board committees are divided into principles on the recommended committees, 
their key functions and their independence. Finally, principles concerning 
shareholders include their protection and the rights of the general meeting and 
principles on disclosure cover quality, timing and content.  
 
The scoring of the individual principles is straightforward: the principles are either 
present in a country code (YES, score equals 1) or not (NO, score equals 0). For some 
principles, however, such as the independence of the board of directors (principle 15) 
and of the board committees (principles 27 to 32), the score ranges between 0 and 2. 
The score in this case equals 2 if a code recommends that the majority of directors or 
members of the committees should be independent. The score is equal to 1 if 
independence is only required for a minimum number of directors. If this topic is not 
covered by the codes or if the number of independent members is not specified, the 
score is 0. We then divide the scores on the independence of the board of directors 
and board committees by 2, so that the final score on these principles lies between 0 
and 1.  
 
Finally, the scores on the individual principles are summed up to arrive at a score per 
subcategory. We rescale this score per subcategory to 1 so that each subcategory has 
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an equal weighting in the total score of the index
4. We obtain CGIj by dividing the 
total score of each country by 13, i.e. the maximum score obtainable on the index. 
The expected sign for CGIj in the model is positive: the more detailed and extended 
the recommendations are the more likely IFRS will be applied as the costs are lower.  
 
We introduce in our model also a measure for the extent of legal shareholder 
protection in a country (LAW2001j). We base our measure on a proxy developed by 
La Porta et al. (1998). This proxy is a combination of 7 shareholder rights, so-called 
anti-director rights, and is based on the company law and commercial code of 
countries in 1993. These anti-director rights cover, for instance, ease of participation 
in corporate voting and legal protection against expropriation by management. We 
have updated this variable to 2001, which is the sample period studied, using the legal 
system overview in the EC’s Comparative Study of Corporate Governance Codes 
(2002). Furthermore, we do not only update this variable but also extend it to make it 
more in line with our corporate governance index. Our law index for 2001 
comprehends 27 principles classified under 6 subcategories, which are in turn divided 
over three broad categories: board of directors, shareholders and disclosure (see Table 
2).  
 
Insert Table 2 about here 
 
As you can see from Table 2, our law index differs slightly from our corporate 
governance index. For instance, our law index only covers three out of the five main 
categories of our corporate governance index. The reason is that laws are mandatory 
for every company and that they remain silent on whether or not a company should 
install different board committees. Hence, our law index does not comprehend the 
general principles and the principles on board committees. Furthermore, the 
subcategories of the law index are also slightly different
5.  
                                                 
4 Not rescaling the scores on the subcategories gives a maximum score of 50 and the same ranking of 
the countries, except for Germany, who loses the lead to Belgium and shares the second place with 
France. The results of our analyses are, however, not significantly influenced. 
 
5 For the board of directors, we combined both the mission and key functions of the board into 1 
subcategory called Responsibilities of the board. The number of principles of these subcategories is 
also reduced from 11 in our corporate governance index to 6 in our law index and we added the 
principle  Fiduciary duty towards shareholders (principle 5). Moreover, compared to the corporate 
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Again the scoring of this index is straightforward. If the laws of a country prescribe a 
certain rule, then the score is equal to 1; otherwise it is 0. Once more we employ an 
equal weighting of the subcategories in the total score by rescaling the score of each 
subcategory to 1
6. Hence, the maximum obtainable score on the law index is 6 and in 
the regressions again a percentage score is used. The expectation is that the higher the 
score of a country, the better shareholders are protected through laws and the more 
likely companies will adopt IFRS. Therefore, the expected sign for the variable 
LAW2001j is positive.  
 
Further, an interaction variable CGIj*LAW2001j, for which a negative coefficient is 
assumed, is introduced in our model.  
 
Next to the test variables, we include in our regression three country control 
variables. First of all, we introduce a proxy for the distance between local accounting 
standards and IFRS (DIST_IFRSj). We employ the benchmark developed by the big 
audit firms (Andersen et al., 2001) and described by Street (2002), which gives an 
overview of the differences between the local standards and IFRS in 62 countries 
based on approximately 80 accounting measures and disclosures. This variable gives 
an indication of the number of adjustments an average company has to make in order 
to comply with IFRS
7. It is clear that if companies have to make a lot of adaptations to 
their accounting system, the switch to IFRS will be more costly for them and they will 
likely postpone the adoption of IFRS. Therefore, a negative sign for this control 
variable is assumed. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
governance index, our law index contains 5 extra shareholders principles. We included under the 
subcategory Shareholders’ protection a number of  shareholders’ rights measured by La Porta et al. 
(1998) that were not included in our corporate governance index (principles 11, 15, 16, 17 and 18). 
Next, we added three extra rights of the General Meeting (principles 20, 21 and 24). With regard to the 
subcategories of disclosure, we did not include the subcategory on timing and that the number of 
principles included in the two remaining subcategories is severely reduced (from 9 to 2).   
 
6 Not rescaling the scores on the subcategories does neither change the ranking of the countries nor 
give significantly different results. 
7 A shortcoming of this variable is that it gives an indication of the number of differences between local 
GAAP and IFRS but not of the significance of these differences. The differences listed may range from 
absence of an overall standard to a detail of inconsistency (Street, 2002). 
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Secondly, we include the extent of earnings management at country level (EMj). This 
variable is developed by Leuz et al. (2003) for 31 countries and is an aggregate score 
of four different earnings management measurements for the period between 1990 
and 1999
8. This variable can be a proxy for the extent to which insiders behave 
opportunistically in a country. If the level of earnings management is high, insiders 
can extract a lot of private benefits without being discovered. As under IFRS the 
possibility to manage earnings, and thus to extract private benefits, is severely 
reduced, companies in countries with a high level of earnings management have a 
lower incentive to switch to IFRS. For this variable we thus assume a priori a negative 
sign. 
 
Finally, we introduce in our model a measure for the size of the capital market, 
namely the total market capitalization of listed companies as a percentage of GDP 
(MARKET_CAPj)
9. On the one hand, strong, well-developed equity markets have 
usually heavy disclosure requirements (Jaggi and Low, 2000). Thus, the changeover 
to IFRS would probably be less demanding for companies in broad equity markets. 
On the other hand, we might also reason that companies in countries with large capital 
markets will be less likely to adopt IFRS as they have a large potential investor base 
in their home market so they do not need to use international accounting standards to 
tap into other markets. So the sign of this variable can not a priori be predicted. 
 
Next to country control variables, we also introduce some company control variables. 
Firstly, we include company size (SIZEi) for which a positive sign is expected. Larger 
companies are more likely to provide stakeholders with more disclosures (Cooke, 
1992; Meek and Roberts, 1995; Jaggi and Low, 2000; Ashbaugh, 2001) because of 
smaller information production costs (Lang and Lundholm, 1993), lower costs of 
competitive disadvantage associated with their disclosures (Meek and Roberts, 1995) 
and higher political costs (Foster, 1986). Moreover, large companies also have a 
broader investor base and thus higher agency costs. The positive link between IFRS 
and the size of the firm is also evidenced by Ashbaugh (2001) and Dumontier and 
                                                 
8 A country’s overall score is computed as the median ratio of the earnings management scores of its 
companies. The earnings management measurements reflect both the level and variability of the 
reported earnings. They cover smoothing of reported operating earnings using accruals, smoothing and 
correlation of accounting accruals and operating cash flow, the magnitude of accruals and small loss 
avoidance based on Burgstahler and Dichev (1997). 
9 We obtain this data from the World Bank. 
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Raffournier (1998). We measure the size of a company by the natural logarithm of the 
total market value (SIZEi). This variable is preferred above the traditional 
measurements such as total assets or sales as these are influenced by the accounting 
standards followed.  
 
A second company control variable is the presence of a big-five auditor 
(AUDITORi). This variable is assumed to have a positive effect on the early adoption 
of IFRS as large audit firms may stimulate companies to disclose more information 
(Raffournier, 1995). Big-five audit firms are also more experienced in the application 
of IFRS (Dumontier and Raffournier, 1998; Murphy, 1999). Dumontier and 
Raffournier (1998) find evidence that companies audited by a large audit firm are 
more likely to adopt IFRS voluntarily. 
 
Thirdly, we introduce a variable indicating whether the company is a financial 
institution or not (FINANCIAL_INDi) based on the SIC-codes. We assume that 
financial institutions were less likely to adopt IFRS in 2001. The reason is that at that 
point the accounting standards that are particularly aimed at financial institutions, 
namely IAS 32 and IAS 39, were not endorsed by the EC.  
 
Next, we introduce the variable LISTINGSi which measures the number of listings 
on a foreign stock exchange. Companies that are listed on foreign stock exchanges 
face additional capital market pressures for the disclosure of information and have to 
comply with more stock exchange requirements (Meek and Roberts, 1995; Cuijpers 
and Buijink, 2004). Thus these companies can be expected to disclose more. The 
adoption of IFRS will also be more likely for companies listed on multiple stock 
exchanges as compliance with IFRS can be seen as a form of expanded disclosure 
specifically aimed at satisfying the needs of foreign users of the financial statements 
(El-Gazzar et al., 1999). A number of studies find a positive relation between the 
number of listings of a company and the voluntary adoption of IFRS (Dumontier and 
Raffournier, 1998; El-Gazzar et al., 1999; Murphy, 1999; Ashbaugh, 2001). 
 
  12 
We also add a measure of ownership concentration (OWNERSHIPi). This variable is 
calculated as the ratio of closely held shares (or shares held by insiders)
10 over 
common shares outstanding. We hypothesize that as ownership concentration 
increases, companies will be less likely to adopt IFRS. Insiders to a firm will more 
likely use other sources of information than the annual report (Cuijpers and Buijink, 
2004). Furthermore, companies with large ownership diffusion have higher potential 
information asymmetries and higher agency costs, and thus higher demands for firm-
specific information. As a consequence, they have an incentive to respond to these 
demands by, for instance, switching to IFRS as this can lower their cost of capital 
(Raffournier, 1995; Cohen, 2004). We thus expect a negative sign for this variable. 
 
The last company control variable captures the proprietary costs of companies. 
Models such as Dye (1986) and Hayes and Lundholm (1996) argue that the 
probability of disclosure decreases as the associated proprietary costs increase. By 
switching to IFRS, companies have to reveal more proprietary information. Hence, 
companies with large proprietary costs will probably not adopt IFRS until it becomes 
mandatory. We include in the regression the variable CAPITAL_INTi which 
measure barriers to entry. High capital intensity is generally interpreted as a major 
barrier of entry (Piotroski, 2003) as new entrants have to make large investments. We 
measure this variable through net property, plant and equipment scaled by total assets. 
A lower value of this variable means higher proprietary costs and as a consequence, a 
lower probability of adopting IFRS before it is mandatory. 
 
An overview of the test and control variables as well as the expected signs can be 
found in Table 3.  
 
Insert Table 3 about here 
 
4. Sample selection and data gathering 
To test the hypotheses developed above, we gather data from two sources. To select 
the companies and collect financial data, we used the Worldscope database from 
                                                 
10 These include shares held by officers, directors and their immediate family, shares of the company 
held by another corporation, shares held by pension or benefit plans and shares held by individuals who 
hold 5% or more of the outstanding shares. 
  13 
DATASTREAM. To score countries on the institutional environment (both laws 
protecting investors laws and corporate governance recommendations), we used the 
EC’s Comparative Study of Corporate Governance Codes (2002).  
 
The sample composition starts with the selection of sample period, namely 2001. The 
next step is the selection of all the listed companies from EU stock exchanges that 
allow the choice between local GAAP and IFRS for domestic and foreign companies 
in 2001. Our sample thus consists of the companies listed on the stock exchanges of 
seven EU Member States, namely Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, 
Italy and the Netherlands. In Sweden, Ireland, Portugal, Spain and Greece domestic 
companies are required to follow local GAAP. In the UK and Luxembourg only 
foreign companies are allowed to use IFRS and in Finland domestic companies can 
apply IFRS, but only under specific circumstances
11. These countries are therefore 
excluded from the sample. Furthermore, companies listed on the New Market 
segment of the German Market are also removed from the sample as these companies 
are obliged to submit their financial statements using either IFRS or US GAAP.  
 
All companies quoted in the year 2001 on these seven stock exchanges and available 
on Datastream are selected
12. This results in an initial sample of 2594 listed 
companies (see Table 4). Of these 2594 companies, 213 or 8% use IFRS. The 
following companies are then removed from the sample: companies listed on the 
German New Market (275), companies reporting according to US GAAP (63), 
companies with missing data on the control variables (559)
13 and outliers (134)
14. A 
                                                 
11 In Finland, domestic listed companies are allowed to follow IFRS (with reconciliation to Finnish 
GAAP) if more than 50% of their shares are owned by foreigners or if the company is listed in an 
OECD country outside the European Economic Area. 
12 We use the total sample of listed companies and not a matched sample because using a matched 
sample will lead to an overclassification of IFRS-companies and as a result to biased estimators 
(Zmijewski, 1984). By using in our final sample as many companies as possible from the total 
population of listed companies, we are able to keep our sample probabilities close to the population 
probabilities. As a result, our estimates will be likely unbiased and we do not have to use a weighted 
logit model. Furthermore, Ohlson (1980) contents that there are certain problems related with matching 
and suggests that it would be more fruitful to include variables as predictors rather than to use them for 
matching purposes. 
13 Most of the time, data was missing on the variable AUDITORi, namely for 408 companies no data 
on the auditors was available. We were not able to hand collect this data as the financial statements of 
these companies were not available on the websites. 
14 This amounts to about 5.2% of our initial sample. Most outliers were on the variables SIZEi and 
CAPITAL_INTi. The large number of outliers in France is due to 60 companies having a capital 
intensity ratio greater than 1. For these companies the fixed assets are thus larger than the total assets, 
or in other words, these companies have negative current assets. We deleted these companies.  
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sample of 1563 companies remains (see Table 4), of which 110 companies (7%) 
voluntarily report according to IFRS. We verified from the hard copies that 
companies following IFRS according to Datastream effectively stated compliance 
with IFRS in their audit report. Listed companies from France (506) and Germany 
(396) make up more than half of this sample. Austria and Belgium have the least 
companies in the sample, 69 and 108 respectively. Most companies following IFRS, 
namely 64 out of 110 (58%), are located in Germany.  
 
Insert Table 4 about here 
 
Next, we gather data to compute the institutional variables. We rate the countries on 
the presence of the principles from our two indexes in their corporate governance 
codes and laws. To this end, we used the Comparative Study of Corporate 
Governance Codes of all EU countries published by the EC (2002). However, only 
corporate governance codes that were published before January 2001 were taken into 
consideration for the computation of our governance index. This means that we 
measure the extent of corporate governance recommendations at the beginning of our 
sample period. In Austria, the first corporate governance code was only published at 
the end of 2002 (Institut Österreichischer Wirtschaftsprüfer, 2002), thus the corporate 
governance score of Austria is zero. In Belgium and France three codes were 
published before January 2001, in Germany and the Netherlands two, and in Denmark 
and Italy only one. The number of codes in a country is indirectly taken into account 
in the computation of the corporate governance index as a principle should only 
appear in one of the codes of a country in order for the country to receive a score on 
that principle. We use the legal system overview in the EC’s Comparative Study of 
Corporate Governance Codes (2002) to score the different countries on our law 
index.  
 
5. Univariate and multivariate results 
5.1. Descriptive statistics and univariate results 
As the main purpose of this paper is to investigate the association between the 
institutional environment and the decision to adopt IFRS, it is interesting to test first 
whether a significant relation exists between the countries and the early adoption of 
IFRS. The χ²-test statistic indicates that a highly significant association (p<0.0001) 
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exists between countries and the number of companies reporting according to IFRS. 
In other words, the number of companies that have adopted IFRS in 2001 depends on 
the country these companies are domiciled in. Austria and Germany have more 
companies than expected following IFRS, while the opposite holds for Belgium, 
Denmark, France, Italy and the Netherlands. Surprisingly, the two countries with 
more companies following IFRS than expected are both German civil law countries. 
Hence, differences in the early adoption of IFRS across countries may be attributed to 
dissimilarities in their institutional environment. 
 
Table 5 gives descriptive statistics of the corporate governance and law index. From 
Table 5 Panel A, we see that Germany has the highest score on the corporate 
governance index (0.5251), followed by Belgium (0.4516). On the contrary, Austria 
has no corporate governance recommendations in 2001. From this table, we can also 
conclude that, given the maximum percentage score for the corporate governance 
index is 1, the extent of corporate governance recommendations could still be 
increased in all countries, as the mean score of the countries is equal to 0.3464 (i.e. a 
score of 4.5 on 13). When we investigate the different categories of the corporate 
governance index, we see that large differences occur between the different countries. 
For instance, Belgium apparently attaches a lot of value to principles on the board of 
directors (0.7944), while France focuses on board committees (0.6310). Finally, 
Germany stresses in its corporate governance codes the importance of shareholders 
(0.6250) and of disclosure (0.5476). 
 
 
Insert Table 5 about here 
 
Table 5 Panel B gives an overview of the scoring of the different countries on the law 
index. Austria has by and large the best legal shareholder protection (0.7540), 
followed by Germany (0.5688). So the two countries with the most companies 
following IFRS also have the strongest shareholder protection, either through 
corporate governance recommendations or through laws. As is the case with the 
corporate governance index, Germany emphasizes the protection of shareholders in its 
laws (0.7163). Austria scores the highest on the other two categories, namely board of 
directors (0.6667) and disclosure (1.0).  
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Company descriptives for each country are given in Table 6 Panel A. The companies 
have on average the same market value in each country, although Danish companies 
are slightly larger (6.07). Almost all Italian companies have a Big Five auditor (0.95). 
In contrast, a Big Five auditor is auditing less than one out of two French companies 
in the sample (0.48). France also has on average the fewest financial institutions 
(0.12), while Denmark has the most (0.37). Dutch companies are on average listed on 
more foreign stock exchanges (0.39) and have the highest capital intensity ratio (0.3). 
Finally, Danish companies are characterised by a low ownership (0.23) compared to 
the other countries.  
 
Insert Table 6 about here 
 
Table 6 Panel B gives the company descriptives for companies following IFRS or 
local GAAP separately. Companies that have adopted IFRS early on seem to be on 
average larger non-financial companies audited by a Big Five auditor and with 
multiple listings. They also have a lower ownership concentration ratio and have a 
slightly larger capital intensity ratio. This corresponds to our expectations. 
 
5.2. Multivariate results 
Different from previous studies (Cuijpers and Buijink, 2004; Dumontier and 
Raffournier, 1998; El-Gazzar et al., 1999), we do not use a traditional logit model. 
The correlation tables are shown in Appendix 1 and 2. As we first selected countries 
for our sample and then companies within each of these countries, we have a clustered 
dataset. This means that our firm-level observations within a country are more likely 
to behave in the same way and are as a consequence not independent. The traditional 
standard error estimates of logistic regression models based on maximum likelihood 
is no longer appropriate for cluster-correlated data since observations in the same 
cluster tend to have similar characteristics and are likely correlated with each other. 
The traditional methods will underestimate the true variance and lead to test statistics 
with inflated Type I errors. Therefore, a logit model with robust standard errors 
estimates is needed to take into account the intra-cluster correlation. We will use 
Rogers standard errors, which are White standard errors adjusted to take into account 
possible correlation within a cluster (Williams, 2000; Rogers, 1993, Petersen, 2005). 
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The results of the logistic regression with robust standard errors is given in Table 7
16. 
The pseudo R² (31.58%) indicates that the model is well specified
17. We find that 
country characteristics are important for explaining the early adoption of IFRS, as the 
pseudo R² of the model without country characteristics only amounts to 5.82%, with 
all the company variables significant at the 5% level. The R² of the model without the 
company variables amounts to 20.72% and all variables are highly significant (p < 
0.01). 
 
The significance of the individual variables shows that strong laws protecting 
shareholders (LAW2001j) encourage companies to early comply with IFRS (p < 
0.0001). We also find that corporate governance recommendations (CGIj)  are 
positively associated with the adoption of IFRS (p < 0.0001). These results are 
consistent with our first two hypotheses and indicate that in countries with weak 
shareholder protection, companies will more likely refrain from adopting IFRS early 
on due to loss of private benefits.  
 
We run a Wald Chi-square test on the coefficients of our corporate governance and 
law index to test whether they are significantly different. Surprisingly, we do not find 
that the coefficients of our indices are significantly different (p = 0.7960). This 
indicates that corporate governance recommendations have an equally strong impact 
on the adoption of IFRS as laws protecting shareholders. So our third hypothesis does 
not hold.  
 
Next, we find that the interaction effect between laws and recommendations is 
significant at the 1% level (p < 0.0001) and has a negative coefficient. This is 
                                                 
15 Reliance on the Rogers standard errors reduces the estimation error but does not eliminate it as the 
number of clusters in our paper is rather small (< 10) (Petersen, 2005). However, we also performed 
the regression with dummy variables for the countries (see section 5.3). Our results stayed robust. 
16 The correlation tables are shown in Appendix 1 and 2. The correlation between corporate governance 
recommendations and laws protecting investors is negative (-0.2984) but not significant. The negative 
sign could indicate that laws and recommendations are substitutes. 
17 Other studies find pseudo R² of about 18% (Ashbaugh, 2001; Cuijpers and Buijink, 2004). 
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consistent with our fourth hypothesis: in countries with strong corporate governance 
recommendations but weak laws, companies will adopt IFRS more easily.  
 
We also find some interesting results with regard to the country control variables. For 
instance, we find that as the distance between local GAAP and IFRS increases, the 
early adoption of IFRS becomes less likely (DIST_IFRSj, p < 0.0001). This is 
consistent with the idea that as the number of accounting changes increase, the 
adoption of IFRS becomes more costly. Secondly, our results show that more earnings 
management under local GAAP, measured by EMj, results in a lower likelihood of 
applying IFRS (p < 0.0001). This is consistent with the notion that companies in 
countries with a lot of accounting flexibility will try to safeguard their private benefits 
by postponing the changeover to IFRS. Thirdly, our results indicate that as the size of 
the capital market increases, companies will stick to their local accounting standards. 
This indicates that as companies have a larger potential domestic investor base, they 
have less need to switch to international accounting standards to tap into other 
markets to obtain enough equity funding (MARKET_CAPj, p < 0.0001). 
 
For the company control variables we find that large (SIZEi,  p < 0.0001), non-
financial (FINANCIAL_INDi, p = 0.0003) companies with a Big Five auditor 
(AUDITORi, p= 0.0013) have a higher rate of early compliance with IFRS. 
Furthermore, as expected, companies with a low ownership concentration 
(OWNERSHIPi, p = 0.007) will adopt IFRS before it is mandatory. However, 
contrarily to previous studies, we do not find that the number of listings (LISTINGSi, 
p = 0.393) is an important explanatory variable. Finally, the level of proprietary costs 
does not seem to have an influence on IFRS-adoption (CAPITAL_INTi, p = 0.380).  
 
Insert Table 7 about here 
 
As an extension of the basic model, different categories of the corporate governance 
index (general principles, board of directors, board committees, shareholders’ rights 
and disclosure) are separately introduced in the model. For each category that is 
introduced in the analysis, we also include an interaction variable with the law index 
(see Table 8). The same analysis is repeated for the categories of the law index. Each 
element (board of directors, shareholders’ rights and disclosure) is separately included 
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as well as the interaction with the corporate governance index (see Table 9). We find, 
for our corporate governance index, that strong recommendations with regard to the 
board of directors, the board committees and disclosure encourage the adoption of 
IFRS. Surprisingly, extensive recommendations with respect to shareholders seem to 
have no impact on the likelihood of adopting IFRS. Concerning the subcategories of 
our law index, we find that all three subcategories, namely board of directors, 
shareholders and disclosure, are positively related with the early adoption of IFRS. 
This seems to suggest that the protection of shareholders’ rights can only be achieved 
through hard laws. In other words, corporate governance recommendations can not 
substitute completely for laws. There are still some areas in which mandatory investor 
protection is needed.  
 
Insert table 8 and 9 about here 
 
5.3. Sensitivity analyses 
Some sensitivity checks are first done with respect to the country variables. Firstly, 
the large number of French and German companies in the sample could suggest that 
these two countries strongly influence our results. So the logistic regressions are rerun 
excluding these two countries and the results stay similar.  
 
Secondly, Austria and Germany are excluded from the sample as these are the 
countries with the largest number IFRS-companies. This reduces the number of 
companies following IFRS in the final sample to 21. Although this number seems 
rather low, the proportion of companies following IFRS in the final sample, excluding 
Austria and Germany, is just slightly above the proportion of companies following 
IFRS in the initial sample, excluding the same countries. Hence our regression results 
will not be biased (Zmijewski, 1984). Excluding Austria and Germany from the 
sample does not significantly alter our results much.  
 
Thirdly, we run regressions with a dummy-variable for Germany and Austria. This 
dummy-variable then captures that Austria and Germany are environments in which 
companies are stimulated more to adopt IFRS. The dummy variable is significantly 
positive at the 1%-level, indicating that companies from Germany and Austria are 
more likely to adopt IFRS early on. The coefficients of the other variables are not 
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significantly influenced by including this dummy-variable. We can thus conclude that 
our results are not driven by the composition of our sample.  
 
Finally, we run regressions without the country variables but with 6 dummy variables 
for the countries. We used Germany as our base-country. We find that, compared to 
Germany, only Austria has a positive impact on IFRS-adoption. Italy has the most 
negative impact on IFRS-adoption.  
 
Some sensitivity checks are also performed for the company control variables. Firstly, 
the size of a company is alternatively measured by the natural logarithm of total assets 
and of sales. These alternative specifications do not change our results. The number of 
listings is also specified differently. We measured this variable alternatively as a 
dummy variable indicating whether or not a company is listed on another stock 
exchange that allows the use of IFRS. We also measured this variable as a dummy 
variable indicating whether or not a company is listed on a stock exchange outside the 
EU. The p-value is the lowest and becomes marginally significant (p = 0.0966) for the 
variable measuring a listing outside the EU. 
 
6. Conclusion 
The purpose of this paper is to explain the early adoption of IFRS from a cost-side 
perspective. As IFRS-adoption is associated with an increase in disclosure and a 
reduction in accounting choices, it leads to less managerial discretion and a loss of 
private benefits for insiders. In this study, we argue that the private benefits insiders 
have to give up by adopting IFRS depend on the characteristics of the institutional 
environment. We investigate, besides the level of legal investor protection, also a 
characteristic of the institutional environment not yet studied, namely the extent of 
corporate governance recommendations. 
 
Our results suggest that IFRS-adoption depends on the level of investor protection. 
Companies will refrain from adopting IFRS early on because of opportunistic 
behaviour by management in countries with weak investor protection. In these 
countries, the costs of adopting IFRS are perceived by the company insiders as higher 
due losses of private benefits. Strong laws protecting investors as well as extended 
corporate governance recommendation in contrast lower private benefits of control, 
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thereby reducing the costs of switching to IFRS for insiders. Furthermore, we find 
that corporate governance recommendations have the same impact on IFRS-adoption 
as hard laws and are able to compensate for the negative impact of weak laws. In 
other words, corporate governance can effectively reduce the potential conflict of 
interest between insiders and outsiders. However, we find that this is not true in case 
specific shareholder rights, such as voting rights and rights of the general meeting. In 
this case, laws are needed in order to effectively constrain the extraction of private 
benefits. 
 
A caveat of this study certainly is that the countries used in our sample are all civil 
law countries. A more extended study, using a wider variety of countries which differ 




We computed the Variance Inflation Factors (VIFs) in order to search for problems of multicollinearity. The VIFs are all below 2.40 for the company variables (highest VIF 
= 2.32 for SIZEi) and below 7.50 for the country variables (highest VIF = 7.45 for LAW2001j). So no problems of multicollinearity will arise in our regressions as the VIFs 
are smaller than 10. 
  SIZEi AUDITORi FINANCIAL_INDi LISTINGSi OWNERSHIPi CAPITAL_INTi
SIZEi 1
AUDITORi 0.3262* 1
FINANCIAL_INDi 0.1223* 0.0604 1
LISTINGSi 0.3413* 0.1130* 0.0109 1
OWNERSHIPi 0.0363 -0.0117 0.0038 -0.0754 1
CAPITAL_INTi 0.0496* 0.0229 -0.1223* 0.0012 0.0768 1
 
Appendix 1: Pearson Correlation Coefficients for the Country Variables 
 N = 7, Prob > |r| under H0 : ρ = 0 
LAW2001j CGIj DIST_IFRSj EMj MARKET_CAPj
LAW2001j 1 
CGIj -0.2984 1  
DIST_IFRSj 0.7413* 0.0775 1 
EMj 0.7814* -0.3068 0.5982 
 
1
MARKET_CAPj -0.8250* 0.0732 -0.7054* -0.7522 1
* significant at the 5% level 
 
Appendix 2: Pearson Correlation Coefficients for the Company Variables 
N = 1563, Prob > |r| under H0 : ρ = 0 
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Table 1: Structure of the Corporate Governance Index (CGIj) 
 
GENERAL PRINCIPLES   
I. Legal basis and compliance (1)   
1. Comply-or-explain principle  Yes / No 
II. Scope (1)   
2. Encouraged to all companies  Yes / No 
BOARD OF DIRECTORS   
III. Mission of the board (5)   
3. Shareholder value maximization  Yes / No 
4. Long-term viability of the company  Yes / No 
5. Good relationship with stakeholders  Yes / No 
6. Effective monitoring of management  Yes / No 
7. Compliance with laws  Yes / No 
IV. Key functions of the board (6)   
8. Guide corporate strategy  Yes / No 
9. Monitor and replace key executives  Yes / No 
10. Review remuneration  Yes / No 
11. Manage potential conflicts of interest  Yes / No 
12. Guard integrity of financial reporting  Yes / No 
13. Increase effectiveness of governance practices  Yes / No 
V. Independence of the board (3)   
14. Separation of chairman and CEO  Yes / No 
15. Mix of inside and outside directors   
              Non-executive directors  None / minimum number / majority 
              Independent directors  None / minimum number / majority 
16. Stock options not allowed as compensation   Yes / No 
BOARD COMMITTEES   
VI. Recommended committees (3)   
17. Appointment committee  Yes / No 
18. Remuneration committee  Yes / No 
19. Audit committee  Yes / No 
VII. Key functions of the committees (7)   
20. Appointment committee: propose appointment of directors  Yes / No 
21. Remuneration committee: recommend remuneration for directors  Yes / No 
22. Audit committee: report to the board  Yes / No 
23. Audit committee: hear the company auditors  Yes / No 
24. Audit committee: ensure appropriateness and consistency of accounting policies  Yes / No 
25. Audit committee: verify accuracy of internal procedures  Yes / No 
26. Audit committee: appoint auditor and determine audit fee  Yes / No 
VIII. Independence of the committees (6)   
27. Appointment committee: non-executive directors  None / minimum number / majority 
28. Appointment committee: independent directors  None / minimum number / majority 
29. Remuneration committee: non-executive directors  None / minimum number / majority 
30. Remuneration committee: independent directors  None / minimum number / majority 
31. Audit committee: non-executive directors  None / minimum number / majority 
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Table 1 (continued): Structure of the Corporate Governance Index (CGIj) 
 
SHAREHOLDERS   
IX. Shareholders’ protection (4)   
33. Equal treatment of shareholders  Yes / No 
34. One share/one vote  Yes / No 
35. No anti-take-over devices  Yes / No 
36. Proxy voting allowed  Yes / No 
X. General meeting (4)   
37. Select new directors  Yes / No 
38. Participate in decisions concerning fundamental changes  Yes / No 
39. Decide on distribution of profits  Yes / No 
40. Ask questions  Yes / No 
DISCLOSURE    
XI. Quality (2)   
41. Use high quality accounting standards  Yes / No 
42. Audited by an independent auditor  Yes / No 
XII. Timing (1)    
43. Timely disclosure of relevant information  Yes / No 
XIII. Contents (7)   
44. Financial situation  Yes / No 
45. Performance  Yes / No 
46. Ownership  Yes / No 
47. Governance  Yes / No 
48. Relevant interests of directors  Yes / No 
49. Composition of the board  Yes / No 
50. Remuneration of key executives  Yes / No 
TOTAL    
*The numbers between brackets indicate the number of principles in each subcategory. 
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Table 2: Structure of the Law Index (LAW2001j)  
 
BOARD OF DIRECTORS    
I. Responsibilities of the board (6)   
1. Probity of financial statements  Yes / No 
2. Monitor management  Yes / No 
3. Guide corporate strategy  Yes / No 
4. Guard compliance with laws and regulations  Yes / No 
5. Fiduciary duty towards shareholders  Yes / No 
6. Avoid conflicts of interests  Yes / No 
II. Independence of the board (3)   
7. Separation of chairman and CEO  Yes / No 
8. Non-executive directors  Yes / No 
9. Independent directors  Yes / No 
SHAREHOLDERS    
III. Shareholders' protection (9)   
10. Proxy voting allowed  Yes / No 
11. Pre-emptive right to new issues  Yes / No 
12. One share/one vote   Yes / No 
13. Equal treatment of shareholders  Yes / No 
14. Anti-takeover devices prohibited  Yes / No 
15. Shares not blocked before meeting  Yes / No 
16. Cumulative voting allowed  Yes / No 
17. Oppressed minorities mechanism installed  Yes / No 
18. Percentage needed to call an extraordinary GM  Yes / No 
IV. General Meeting (7)   
19. Ask questions  Yes / No 
20. Submit proposals  Yes / No 
21. Decide on remuneration of directors  Yes / No 
22. Select directors  Yes / No 
23. Decide on distribution of profits  Yes / No 
24. Appoint statutory auditor  Yes / No 
25. Agree on fundamental changes   Yes / No 
DISCLOSURE    
V. Quality (1)   
26. Audited by an independent auditor  Yes / No 
VI. Contents (1)   
27. Remuneration  Yes / No 
TOTAL     
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Table 3: Overview of the Variables Included in the Model  
 
  Definition Expected  sign 
With dependent variable     
IFRSij
= 1 if company i in country j follows IFRS in 2001, 0 
otherwise   
With test variables     
LAW2001i
= Extent of laws protecting shareholders within 
country j in 2001  + 
CGIj
= Extent of corporate governance recommendations 
within country j in 2001  + 
CGIi*LAW2001i
= Interaction term between extent of corporate 
governance recommendations and extent of laws   - 
With country control variables     
DIST_IFRSj
= Distance between local GAAP and IFRS based on 
90 accounting measures and disclosures as 
measured by Street (2002) 
- 
EMj
= Degree of earnings management as measured by 
Leuz et al. (2002)  - 
MARKET_CAPj
= Total market capitalisation of the listed companies 
in country j in 2001 (Worldbank)  ? 
With company control variables     
SIZEi
= Company size measured by the natural logarithm of 
total market value (Datastream)  + 
AUDITORi
= 1 if company i has a big-five auditor, 0 otherwise 
(Datastream)  + 
FINANCIAL_INDi
= 1 if company i is a financial institution, 0 otherwise, 
based on the two-digit SIC-code (Datastream)  - 
LISTINGS 
= Number of listings on a foreign stock exchange 
(Datastream)  + 
OWNERSHIPi
= Ratio of closely held shares over common shares 
outstanding in 2001 (Datastream)  - 
CAPITAL_INTi
= Ratio of fixed assets over total assets in 2001 




Table 4: Sample Selection 
 
   Austria  Belgium Denmark France  Germany Italy  Netherlands  Total 
All listed companies in 
Datastream
$ 89 139 175 833 942  260  156  2594 


















  - German New Market listings  (0) (0)  (0)  (0)  (275) (0)  (0)  (275) 
  - companies using US GAAP  (6)  (3) (0)  (10)  (37) (0)  (7)  (63) 
  - Missing values  (10)  (24)  (23)  (239) (201)  (48)  (14)  (559) 
  - Outliers (4)  (4)  (8)  (78)




















































$Datastream coverage for our sample countries varies between 88% for Denmark and 99% for the Netherlands. The average 
coverage ratio for the 7 countries is 94.6%. 
#60 companies of these 78 were deleted because of a capital intensity ratio higher than 1, which means that the fixed assets of 
these companies are larger than the total assets. In other words, these companies have negative current assets. 
 



















































































































































































Austria  0 0.0 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Belgium  3 0.5 0.7944 0.3770 0.2500 0.2857 0.4517 
Denmark   1 0.0 0.2333 0.4286 0.5000 0.0476 0.2407 
France  3 0.0 0.4333 0.6310 0.3750 0.0952 0.3253 
Germany  2 0.5 0.4778 0.5000 0.6250 0.5476 0.5251 
Italy  1 0.5 0.3444 0.4563 0.1250 0.0952 0.03029 
Netherlands   2 0.0 0.4778 0.0000 0.2500 0.0952 0.1707 
Mean   1.71 0.2278 0.4239 0.4572 0.3808 0.2144 0.3464 
Median  2.00 0.0000 0.4333 0.5000 0.3750 0.0952 0.3253 
Max  3.00 0.5000 0.7944 0.6310 0.6250 0.5476 0.5251 
Min  0.00 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Std Dev  1.11 0.2491 0.1504 0.1941 0.1849 0.2020 0.1349 
Q1  1.00 0.0000 0.3444 0.4286 0.2500 0.0952 0.3029 



























































































Austria  0.6667 0.5952 1.0 0.7540
Belgium  0.4167 0.4127 0.0 0.2765
Denmark   0.5000 0.4524 0.0 0.3175
France  0.5000 0.5952 0.0 0.3651
Germany  0.5000 0.7063 0.5 0.5688
Italy  0.5000 0.5794 0.5 0.5265
Netherlands   0.3333 0.3810 0.0 0.2381
Mean   0.4875 0.5774 0.2374 0.4341
Median  0.5000 0.5952 0.0000 0.3651
Max  0.6667 0.7063 1.0000 0.7540
Min  0.3333 0.3810 0.0000 0.2381
Std Dev  0.0624 0.1045 0.2906 0.1342
Q1  0.5000 0.5794 0.0000 0.3651
Q3  0.5000 0.7063 0.5000 0.5688
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Table 6 Panel A: Descriptives of Company Variables per Country 
 
   N SIZEi AUDITORi FINANICIAL_INDi LISTINGSi OWNERSHIPi CAPITAL_INTi
Austria 69 4.2089  0.6377 0.3333 0.0580 0.3450  0.2845
Belgium 108 5.0229  0.5926 0.2870 0.2222 0.4081  0.2572
Denmark 144 6.0746  0.8750 0.3681 0.0556 0.2332  0.2425
France 506 4.6813  0.4842 0.1225 0.0949 0.4399 0.1760
Germany 396 4.5965  0.5884 0.2374 0.2071 0.4650  0.2868
Italy 208 5.8627  0.9519 0.2644 0.2067 0.4442  0.2019
Netherlands 132 5.3932  0.9015 0.1742 0.3939 0.3309  0.3000
Mean 226.86 5.0083  0.6583 0.2182 0.1670 0.4122  0.2345
Median 147.00 4.8283  1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.4741  0.1686
Max 514.00 11.6841  1.0000 1.0000 10.0000 0.9887 0.9925
Min 69.00 0.3001  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000
St Dev  167.09 2.1142  0.4744 0.4131 0.8615 0.3246  0.2314
Q1 121.50 3.5041  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0343




Table 6 Panel B: Descriptives of Company Variables for IFRS and local GAAP 
 
  IFRS Local  GAAP 
N  110 1453 
SIZEi 5.9178 4.9394 
AUDITOR  0.8091 0.6469 
FINANICIAL_INDi 0.1454 0.2237 
LISTINGSi 0.5727 0.1363 
OWNERSHIPi 0.3535 0.4166 
CAPITAL_INTi 0.2796 0.2311 
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Table 7: Results of the Logistic Regression  
***significant at 1% level, 
**significant at 5% level, 




Std Error  Pr > ChiSq 
Intercept -0.837  0.621  0.178 
Test variables      
LAW2001j 55.144 1.245  <.0001
***
CGIj 54.425 1.348  <.0001
***
CGIj*LAW2001j -83.686 2.023  <.0001
***
Country control variables 
DIST_IFRSj -0.704 0.013  <.0001
***
EMj -0.572 0.009  <.0001
***
MARKET_CAPj -0.078 0.003  <.0001
***
Company control variables 
SIZEi 0.356 0.061  <.0001
***
AUDITORi 0.914 0.203  0.0013
***
FINANCIAL_INDi -1.196 0.230  0.0003
***
LISTINGSi 0.052 0.061  0.393 
OWNERSHIPi -0.944 0.350  0.007
***
CAPITAL_INTi -0.200 0.228  0.380 
 
R² = 31.58% 
 
    Parameter  Estimate  Pr > ChiSq  Estimate  Pr > ChiSq  Estimate  Pr > ChiSq  Estimate  Pr > ChiSq  Estimate  Pr > ChiSq 
Intercept                      17.7605 0.0004 11.1337 0.0048 28.4993 <.0001 26.1900 <.0001 11.3169 <.0001
CG_GENERALj 39.6935                 
               
               
                 
                 
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
                   
         
                   
<.0001
*** NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
CG_BOARDj NA NA 42.7276  <.0001
*** NA NA NA NA NA NA
CG_COMMj NA NA NA NA 68.4350  <.0001
*** NA NA NA NA
CG_SHAREHj NA NA NA NA NA NA 17.2490 0.1689
  NA NA






  43.2420 <.0001
***

















































CAPITAL_INTi -0.2000 0.7322 -0.2000 0.7322 -0.2000 0.7322 -0.2000 0.7322 -0.2000 0.7322
Table 8: Results of the Logistic Regression with the Categories of CGI.  
***significant at 1% level, 
**significant at 5% level, 
*significant at 10% level 




     
  
 
Table 9: Results of the Logistic Regression with the Categories of LAW2001.  
***significant at 1% level, 
**significant at 5% level, 
*significant at 10% level 
N = 1563 
 
 
Parameter  Estimate  Pr > ChiSq  Estimate  Pr > ChiSq  Estimate  Pr > ChiSq 
Intercept -89.4007  <.0001  -17.4120  0.0004  -19.2213  0.0003 
LAW_BOARDj 168.5000 <.0001
*** NA NA  NA NA 
LAW_SHAREHj NA NA  67.3056  <.0001
*** NA NA 







































CAPITAL_INTi -0.2000 0.7322  -0.2000  0.7322 -0.2000 0.7322 
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